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Seamless handover across diﬀerent access technologies is very important in the future wireless networks. To optimize vertical
handover in heterogeneous networks, IEEE 802.21 standard defines Media Independent Handover (MIH) services. The MIH
services can be a new target to attackers, which will be the main concern for equipment vendors and service providers. In this
paper, we focus specifically on security of Media Independent Information Service (MIIS) and present a new access authentication
scheme with user anonymity for MIIS. The protocol can be used to establish a secure channel between the mobile node and the
information server. Security and performance of the protocol are also analyzed in this paper.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in wireless communication technologies
have resulted in the evolution of various wireless networks,
such as cellular network, wireless local area network, ad hoc
network personal communication network, Communication
in next generation networks will use multiple access tech-
nologies, creating a heterogeneous network environment [1].
Practically, a single network cannot cater for all diﬀerent user
needs or provide all services. Nowadays the availability of
multimode mobile devices capable of connecting to diﬀerent
wireless technologies provides users with the possibility to
switch their network interfaces to diﬀerent types of networks.
Real-time multimedia services such as voice over IP and
interactive streaming become more and more popular in
current wireless networks, so ubiquitous roaming support
for real-time multimedia traﬃc in an access independent
manner becomes increasingly important. Seamless mobility
can be achieved by enabling mobile terminals to conduct
seamless handovers across diverse access networks, that
is, seamlessly transfer and continue their ongoing sessions
from one access network to another. Vertical handover in
the heterogeneous networks is one of the major challenges
for seamless mobility with ubiquitous connectivity, since
each access network may have diﬀerent mobility, quality of
service,Fn and security requirements [2]. Moreover, real-
time applications have stringent performance requirements
on end-to-end delay and packet loss. In general, the vertical
handover process can be divided into three main phases,
namely, system discovery, handover decision, and handover
execution [3]. During the system discovery phase, the mobile
terminals have to determine which networks can be used
and the services available in each network. These wireless
networks may also advertise the supported data rates for
diﬀerent services. During the handover decision phase, the
mobile device determines which network it should connect
to. The decision may depend on various parameters or
handover metrics including the available bandwidth, delay,
jitter, access cost, transmit power, current battery status of
the mobile device, and even the user’s preferences. Finally,
during the handover execution phase, the connections need
to be rerouted from the existing network to the new
network in a seamless manner. This phase also includes the
authentication and authorization, and the transfer of user’s
context information.
In order to achieve seamless vertical handover in het-
erogeneous networks, many works have been carried out to
address the issues of service continuity. Some of them made














Figure 1: MIIS in heterogeneous networks.
eﬀorts to methods about discovering neighbor networks and
related information [4, 5]. Some of them focused on the
issue of choosing the next network based on factors like
bandwidth, cost, date rate, and so forth when the device
is moving out of the current network [6–8]. Also, several
approaches were published showing how to perform a fast
authentication between diﬀerent access technologies when
handover-took place [9–11]. Apart from these, a number of
works have also been carried out towards addressing other
handover related issues [12–14].
Recent eﬀorts by the IEEE 802.21 working group have
designed a framework [15] to facilitate handover between
heterogeneous networks by providing mobile users with
information useful for making handover decisions. Examples
of the information are the presence of neighboring networks,
the type of their links, their characteristics, and the services
supported. The heart of the framework is the Media
Independent Handover Function (MIHF) which provides
abstracted services to higher layers and vice versa bymeans of
a unified interface. This is accomplished by defining a set of
services, the Media Independent Handover (MIH) services,
which consist of Media Independent Event Service (MIES),
Media Independent Command Service (MICS), and Media
Independent Information Service (MIIS). The MIES defines
a solution for providing applications running above the data
link layer with information about events triggered at the data
link layer, such as the ones about the status of the link (link
up, link down, etc.). TheMICS introduces a set of commands
that allows mobility functions running on the IP layer, or
higher, to control the switching, scanning, and configuration
functions of the data link layer. The MIIS specifies informa-
tion about nearby networks useful for handover decisions
and the query/response mechanism that allows mobile nodes
to get that information. Users get that information from one
or more information servers supporting MIH, as depicted
in Figure 1. The Information Server (IS) may be located in
the visited domains or in the users’ home domain, that is,
the domain of the service provider that holds information
about the users’ authentication and authorization profiles.
The IEEE 802.21 working group is not trying to design a
new mobility protocol, but to introduce a framework that
supports the nodes involved in themobility procedure to take
handover decisions and to control the handover procedure.
The IEEE 802.21 framework is complementary to existing
mobility frameworks of wireless network.
As can be seen from Figure 1, MIH messages are
exchanged over various wireless media between mobile
nodes and access networks. Thus the MIH services can be
a new target to attackers, which will be the main concern for
equipment vendors and service providers [16]. Some typical
threats about MIIS are listed below.
(i) Identity Spoofing. Attempting to gain access to informa-
tion service by using a false identity.
(ii) Tampering. Unauthorized modification of information
data exchanged.
(iii) Information Disclosure. Unwanted exposure of informa-
tion data.
(iv) Denial of Service. The process of making information
service unavailable to a user.
In addition, another important threat regarding the
handover scenario is about user anonymity. It is desirable
to hide the roaming user’s identity and movements from
eavesdroppers and even servers diﬀerent from the home
server he subscribed to. In heterogeneous wireless environ-
ments a roaming user needs to acquire neighbor network
information from IS. If a user’s identity is exposed to IS, the
movements of the mobile user may be easily tracked by IS,
since it knows the user’s current location information and
possible target of handover.
However, security mechanisms are not within the scope
of the IEEE 802.21 standard. Security of MIH protocol
currently relies on security of underlying transport protocols
without a mechanism to authenticate peerMIH entities. This
lack of authentication of peer MIH entities does not provide
proper authorization for MIH services. Because IEEE 802.21
provides services that aﬀect network resource, network cost,
and user experience, MIH level security will be an important
factor to network providers that want to deploy these MIH
services in their networks. Nevertheless, there are very few
security mechanisms for MIH services in the literature.
IEEE 802.21a task group was set up to address security
issues of MIH services. The task of the group is [17]:
(i) to reduce the latency during authentication and key
establishment for handovers between heterogeneous access
networks that support IEEE 802.21 (ii) to provide data
integrity, confidentiality, replay protection, and data origin
authentication to MIH protocol exchanges and enable
authorization for MIH services. The technical requirements
document [18] of the group describes usage scenarios and
requirements for security signaling optimization during
vertical handover and MIH protocol security. The scope of
document [19] is to propose some solutions based on the
requirements described in [18].
Won et al. proposed a new secureMIHmessage transport
solution called MIHSec [20]. The idea of MIHSec is to
utilize the Master Shared Key (MSK) generated by the L2
authentication procedure, for generating the MIH keys.
MIHsec method though has a good performance for MIH
message transportation, it introduces other issues. First, it
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is closely integrated with L2 authentication, thus it is not
media independent. Second, the MSK needs to be securely
delivered to IS by AR (access router), which means a security
association should be settled apriori between each AR and IS.
So the scheme does not posses scalability. Finally, in MIHsec
protocol, the AR that sends the MSK to the IS may know the
key for MIH messages encryption, which degrades the level
of security.
We note that user anonymity is not addressed in all above
schemes. It is very important for a roaming user to keep
his identity secret and movements untraceable. This paper
proposes an anonymous protocol for Secure Access of MIIS,
which is denoted as SAM for short. SAM not only has high
level security but also obtains good performance. We give
a rigorous formal analysis of its security using a modular
approach. Some experiments and simulations about SAMare
also done to evaluate performance of the protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
is a quick review over some related works. In Section 3
we present our new approach in detail. Section 4 gives a
formal security proof of our protocol under the CK model.
Section 5 includes performance analysis. Finally, conclusions
and future works are given in Section 6.
2. Related Works
2.1. 802.21a Task Group Proposals. Security is crucial for
IEEE 802.21 standard to reach its market potential. Seamless
mobility requires seamless security to make its applicability
to government and enterprise networks. Thus 802.21a task
group are making eﬀorts to security mechanisms for IEEE
802.21 standard. In [19], proactive authentication techniques
and MIH protocol level security mechanisms are elaborated.
Proactive authentication is a process by which an entity
can perform a-priori network access authentication with a
media independent authenticator and key holder (MIA-KH)
that is serving a candidate network. The entity performs such
authentication in anticipation of handover to the neighbor-
ing networks. Proactive authentication can be performed in
two ways: (i) direct proactive authentication whereby the
authentication signaling is transparent to the serving MIA-
KH and (ii) indirect proactive authentication whereby the
serving MIA-KH is aware of the authentication signaling. In
each case either EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
[21] or ERP (EAP Reauthentication Protocol) [22] can be
used as the authentication protocol.
As to MIH protocol security, two security frameworks
were proposed: (i) MIH service access control applied
through an authentication server and (ii) MIH service access
control not applied through an authentication server.
In the first case (Figure 2), the access control may be
applied by an access authentication through an EAP server
or an AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting)
server. Upon a successful authentication, the Mobile Node
(MN) is authorized to access theMIH service through a Point
of Service (PoS). The access authentication includes a key
establishment procedure so that related keys are established
between the MN and the Authentication Server (AS). The
MN PoS
(D)TLS handshake









Figure 3: MIH security without access control.
method can provide MIH level protection independent to
media and network access protection. Since MIH protection
is end to end between the MN and the PoS, it is independent
of the transport protocol for MIH. The use case is suitable
for MIIS since the PoS for MIIS is more centralized. In
the proposed approach, EAP framework is used over MIH
protocol for carrying messages of MIH service authentica-
tion, where the PoS acts as an authenticator and also runs
as an AAA client. TLS [23] or DTLS [24] is introduced to
the authentication process, key establishment, and ciphering.
(D)TLS handshake is carried out over MIH protocol, and a
MIH SA (Security Association) is established between two
MIHF peers. Once the MIH SA is established by the MIH
protocol, there is no need to have MIH transport level
security.
In the second case (Figure 3), the MIH service access
control is not applied through any access controller. The
mutual authentication may be based on a preshared key
or a trusted third party like certificate authority (CA).
The MN and the PoS will directly conduct a mutual
authentication and key establishment protocol to setup a-
MIH-specific SA. The use case allows pairwise MIH level
mutual authentication and protection. This kind of MIH
protection is independent of media and access technique.
Since the MIH protection is end to end between the MN
and the PoS, it does not rely on the transport protocol. The
use case can treat MIIS, MIES, and MICS equally because no
centralized server is involved.
2.2. Canetti-Krawczyk Model. A proof of security has become
an essential statement for structural correctness of mutual
authentication and key establishment protocols. Canetti and
Krawczyk [25] proposed amodel for provable security, which
provided reusable building blocks for construction of new
provably secure protocols. We refer to this model as the CK
model in this paper. Here a description of the CK model is
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given. Further details can be found in [25]. The CK model
defines protocol principals who may simultaneously run
multiple local copies of amessage-driven protocol. Each local
copy is called a session and has its own local state. Two
sessions are matching if each session has the same session
identifier and the purpose of each session is to establish a
key between the particular two parties running the sessions.
A session is expired if the session key agreed in the session
has been erased from the session owner’s memory.
A powerful adversary A attempts to break the protocol
by interacting with the principals. In addition to controlling
all communications between principals, the adversary is able
to corrupt any principal, thereby learning all information in
the memory of that principal (e.g., long-term keys, session
states, and session keys). The adversary may impersonate a
corrupted principal, although the corrupted principal itself
is not activated again and produces no further output or
messages. The adversary may also reveal internal session
states or agreed session keys. The adversary must be eﬃcient
in the sense of being a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm. An unexposed session is the one such that neither
it nor a matching session has had its internal state or agreed
session key revealed. If the owner of the session or amatching
session is corrupted, the corruption occurs after the key has
expired at the corrupted party.
Two adversarial models are defined: the unauthenticated-
links adversarial model (UM) and the authenticated-links
adversarial model (AM). The only diﬀerence between them
is the amount of control the adversary has over the commu-
nications channels between principals. The UM corresponds
to the “real world” where the adversary completely controls
the network in use and may modify or create messages
from any party to any other party. The AM is a restricted
version of the UM where the adversary may choose whether
or not to deliver a message, but if a message is delivered,
it must have been created by the specified sender and be
delivered to the specified recipient without alteration. In
addition, any such message may only be delivered once. In
this way, authentication mechanisms can be separated from
key agreement mechanisms by proving the key agreement
secure in the AM, and then applying an authentication
mechanism to the key agreement messages so that the overall
protocol is secure in the UM.
To define the session key security of a key exchange
(KE) protocol, the capability of the adversary is extended
by allowing it to perform a test-session query. At any time
during the game, A can issue a test-session query on a KE-
session that is completed, unexpired, and unexposed. Let
k be the corresponding session key. A coin bR ∈ {0, 1} is
tossed by the game simulator after receiving a test-session
query from the adversary. If b = 0, k is returned to A;
otherwise, a value chosen according to the distribution of
session keys is returned to A. A can still carry out regular
activities on this test-session after issuing the query but is
not allowed to expose the test-session. However, the attacker
is allowed to corrupt a partner to the test-session as soon as
the test-session expires at that party. This captures the perfect
forward secrecy property of a key exchange protocol. At the
end of its run, A outputs a bit b′ (as its guess for b).
Definition 1. A key exchange protocol π is called session key
(SK)-secure in the AM if the following properties are satisfied
for any AM-adversary A.
(1) If two uncorrupted parties complete matching ses-
sions then they both output the same key;
(2) the probability that A guesses correctly the bit b is
no more than 1/2 plus a negligible fraction about the
security parameter.
The definition of SK-secure protocols in the UM is done
analogously. By distinguishing between the AM and the UM,
Canetti and Krawczyk allow for a modular approach to the
design of SK-secure protocols. Protocols that are SK-secure
in the AM can be converted into SK-secure protocols in the
UM by applying an authenticator to it. An authenticator is
a protocol translator C that takes as input a protocol π and
outputs another protocol π′ = C(π), with the property that
if π is SK-secure in the AM, then π′ is SK-secure in the UM.
Authenticators can be constructed by applying a message
transmission (MT) authenticator to each of the messages of
the input protocol. Canetti and Krawczyk [25] and Tin et al.
[26] provided some examples of MT-authenticators.
3. Anonymous Access Authentication of MIIS
The MIIS message exchanges are critical to handover deci-
sion phase. Therefore the process of MIIS message exchanges
has to be trusted. The mobile user needs both to protect
itself from threats, and to provide the IS provable trust, in
order that they can exchange the information securely. The
user also wants to keep his identity secret and movements
untracked from eavesdroppers, particularly the IS.
This section focuses on a new proposal SAM for
anonymous access authentication of MIIS. The scenario we
considered is that the access control for information service is
applied through an access authentication controller, namely,
an AS. The new solution has the advantages of lightweight
computation, low communication cost, and easy implemen-
tation.
3.1. Network Model. We consider a wireless scenario as
depicted in Figure 4. There are some application servers
(S1, S2) in core network, which provide application services
like, voice over IP, video conference, interactive games, and
so forth. When an MN passes the network access authenti-
cation, it establishes connection with a Point of Attachment
(PoA). The MN may request a kind of application service
through a certain PoS. Frequently, some kind of authen-
tication mechanism is necessary for application service to
prevent invalid access without authority. In order to support
mobile users to handover seamlessly between heterogeneous
networks, an IS is deployed to provide information about
neighbor networks for mobile users. We assume that all
MNs should register with an AS and subscribe some services
they needed at network initialization. When an MN registers
to the AS, it generates a random number as the long-
term shared key kM with the MN. Presumably AS has a
pair of public/private keys (gx, x), which are generated by













Figure 4: MIIS access control in the network.
itself. These keys are used to achieve user anonymity. In our
network model, the attacker is able to corrupt any principal
except for AS which is assumed beyond the attacker’s control.
We also assume that AS delivers kM and public key gx to MN
using a mechanism outside of the proposed protocol, such as
preloading these keys.
Here, MIIS is taken as a service at the application
layer. It is assumed that MNs have no secure associations
with application servers directly. In scenario where many
application servers exist, Kerberos [27] is an eﬃcient scheme
for secure access of services because of its singlesign-on
characteristic. We adopt a simplified version of Kerberos
for easy deployment. Suppose that AS and TGS (Ticket
Granting Server) are implemented by the same physical
entity, which simplifies protocol design. We also assume that
all application servers, (S1, S2, and so on, including IS) have
shared some keys with the AS, respectively. For example,
there is a long-term key kAS-IS shared between the IS and
the AS for secure connection or authentication. Suppose
that pr f () is a secure key derivation function, and h() is
a secure hash function. We assume that there is a time
synchronization mechanism in the system. Below the new
scheme is described in detail.
3.2. MIIS Access Authentication with User Anonymity. In
order to handover seamlessly between heterogeneous net-
works while enjoying some real-time applications, each
MN has to subscribe MIIS to AS when initializing. AS
maintains an entry for each registered MN, which consists
of the following items: IDMN, kM , service list. After an
MN connects to the network, it should contact IS to get
information about neighbor networks. Since the MN has
no security associations with application servers (including
IS), the access control of application services is applied
through AS. To this end, the MN must obtain service ticket
for IS. Then mutual authentication is performed between
MN and IS using the service ticket. The message flows of








where TID = h(gr), k = pr f (grx)
MACM = h(kM , TReq, gr , TID, IDIS, Enck(IDMN), IDAS, tM)
(2) TRes, TID, T , EnckM (TID, IDIS, σ), IDAS, tA, MACA,
where T = {TID, IDIS, EnckAS-IS (TID, IDIS, σ)},
MACA = h(kM , TRes, TID, T , EnckM (TID, IDIS, σ), IDAS, tA)
where MAC′M = h(σ , SAReq, IDIS, T , TID, t′M)
(4) SARes, TID, IDIS, tIS, MACI ,
where MACI = h(σ , SARes, TID, IDIS, tI )
(1) TReq, gr , TID, IDIS, Enck(IDMN), IDAS, tM , MACM ,
(3) SAReq, IDIS, T , TID, t′M , MAC
′
M ,
Figure 5: Message flows of SAM.
describe service ticket request and response flow and (3) to
(4) describe mutual authentication between MN and IS.
(1) IS service ticket request (MN→AS). MN selects a random
number r and computes k = pr f (gxr) as an anonymity
key using public key gx of AS. The identity IDMN of MN is
encrypted with k. A temporary identity TID is also computed
using the equation: TID = h(gr). Then MN sends a service
Ticket REQuest message (T REQ) to AS for IS. The message
content of T REQ is as the following, {TReq, gr , TID, IDIS,
Enck(IDMN), IDAS, tM , MACM}, where TReq denotes the
identifier of the request, IDIS denotes the identifier of the
information server, tM is the timestamp of MN, and MACM
is a message authentication code derived from the equation
MACM = h(kM , TReq, gr , TID, IDIS, Enck(IDMN), IDAS, tM).
(2) IS service ticket response (AS→MN). Upon receiving the
T REQ message from MN, AS extracts gr then computes
k = pr f (grx) using gr and its private key x. AS decrypts
the ciphertext Enck(IDMN), and gets the identity of MN.
AS finds the item related to MN in its database, namely,
the entry (IDMN, kM , service list). Then AS checks if the
timestamp tM is within some allowable range compared with
its current time. If tM is not valid, the request message
is dropped because of staleness. Otherwise, AS computes
the value h(kM , TReq, gr , TID, IDIS, Enck(IDMN), IDAS,tM)
using kM . If the value matches with MACM in T REQ,
AS believes the message is really originated from MN. AS
checks service list of MN to find whether it has subscribed
service of IS. If MN has not subscribed the service of
IS, AS will respond a reject message to MN. Otherwise,
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a service ticket T will be generated for MN. AS chooses
a random number σ as the service key used by MN and
IS for secure connection. The format of service ticket is
as follows: T = {TID, IDIS, EnckAS-IS (TID, IDIS, σ)}, where
EnckAS-IS (TID, IDIS, σ) denotes the cipertext encrypted with
the key kAS-IS shared between AS and IS.
AS generates a service Ticket RESponse (T RES) mes-
sage. The T RES message consists of the following items
{TRes, TID, T,EnckM (TID, IDIS, σ), IDAS, tA, MACA},
where TRes denotes identifier of the response, tA is
the timestamp of AS, and MACA is a message authen-
tication code derived from the equation: MACA =
h(kM , TRes, TID,T, EnckM(TID, IDIS, σ), IDAS, tA).
Afterwards, T RES message is transmitted to MN by AS.
(3) IS service access request (MN→ IS). When MN receives
the T RES message from AS, MN first validates tA. If the
result is positive, it calculates the value h(kM , TRes, TID, T,
EnckM(TID, IDIS, σ), IDAS, tA) and compares the value with
MACA in the T RES message. If the two values are identical,
MN believes the message is generated by AS. MN decrypts
EnckM (TID, IDIS, σ) to get the service key σ .
Now MN is able to contact with IS for MIIS. MN needs
to send an information Service Access REQuest message
(S Acce REQ) to IS. The message format of S Acce REQ is as
the following: {SAReq, IDIS, T, TID, t′M , MAC′M}, where
SAReq denotes identifier of the request, T is the service ticket
generated by AS, and t′M is current timestamp ofMN. MAC
′
M
is calculated using MAC′M = h(σ , SAReq, IDIS,T, TID, t′M).
(4) IS service access response (IS→MN). On receiving the
IS Acce REQ message, IS validates t′M and decrypts T
using the key kAS-IS shared with AS to obtain the service
key σ . It also gets the identifiers in the service ticket to
determine whether the ticket is for TID and IS. Then
IS computes h(σ , SAReq, IDIS,T, TID, t′M) and compares it
with the value of MAC′M . If the two values are identi-
cal, IS believes the requestor is a valid client. IS then
computes ks = pr f (σ , TID, IDIS) as the service session
key. IS generates an information Service Access RESponse
message (S Acce RES) and sends to MN. The message has
the following items: {SARes, TID, IDIS, tIS,MACI}, where
SARes denotes the identifier of the response and MACI =
h(σ , SARes, TID, IDIS, tI).
After MN receives S Acce RES message, MN first val-
idates tI then computes h(σ , SARes, TID, IDIS, tI) and
compares it with the value of MAC′M . If the two values are
identical, IS passes the authentication to MN. MN computes
ks = pr f (σ , TID, IDIS) as the session key of information
service. Afterwards, MN uses the service session key to secure
access MIIS.
For accessing services other than theMIIS, the user needs
to obtain the corresponding service ticket from AS. The
user then sends an authentication request message directly
to the application server which runs the authentication
process as depicted in Figure 5. Based on the user credentials,
the application server authenticates the user, which means




EnckM (IDMN, IDIS, σ)
SAReq, IDMN, IDIS,T
SARes, IDIS, IDMN
Figure 6: Flow chart of SKD protocol for MIIS access.
to grant access or not according to the authentication
result. The application server and the user can use the
shared secret key resulting from successful authentication
to set up IPSec security at IP level or simply use the
key to perform symmetric-cryptography based security at
application level.
4. Formal Security Proof of SAM Protocol
In this section, we will give a rigorous proof for security
of SAM under the CK model. We first present a basic SK-
secure protocol in AM. Second, we extend it to achieve
user anonymity. Third, we apply authenticators to the
protocol to derive a protocol that is automatically secure
in UM. Finally, we get our new protocol by reordering
and reusing message components to optimize the resulting
protocol.
4.1. Secure Key Distribution (SKD) Protocol in AM. We
propose a key distribution protocol in AM where MN and
IS rely on a trusted server AS for service key generation. This
protocol uses only symmetric encryption. Figure 6 shows the
flow chart of the protocol.
(1) IS service ticket request (MN→AS). MN sends a service
ticket request message (T REQ) to AS for IS. The message
content of T REQ is as {TReq, IDMN, IDIS}.
(2) IS service ticket response (AS→MN). Upon receiving the
T REQ message from MN, AS validates if MN and IS are
the correct entities which have proper contractions with it.
Then AS checks service list of MN to find whether MN has
subscribed service of IS. If MN has subscribed the service of
IS, AS chooses a random number σ as the service key used
by MN and IS for secure connection. AS generates a service
ticket as follows: T = {TID, IDIS, EnckAS-IS (TID, IDIS, σ)}.
Then AS sends to MN a service ticket response message
(T RES). The T RESmessage consists of the following items:
{TRes, IDMN, IDIS, T, EnckM(IDMN, IDIS, σ)}.
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(3) IS service access request (MN→ IS). When MN receives
the T RES message from AS, MN needs to send an infor-
mation Service Access REQuest message (S Acce REQ) to
IS. The message format of S Acce REQ is as the following:
{SAReq,TID, IDIS,T}.
(4) IS service access response (IS→MN). On receiving the
IS Acce REQ message, IS decrypts T using the key kAS-IS to
obtain the identity of MN (which is confirmed by AS) and
service key σ . IS then computes ks = pr f (σ , IDMN, IDIS) as
the service session key. IS generates an information Service
Access RESponse message (S Acce RES) and sends it to MN.
The message has the following items: SARes, IDMN, IDIS.
After MN receives S Acce RES message, MN computes
ks = pr f (σ , IDMN, IDIS) as the session key of information
service. Afterwards, MN uses the service session key to secure
access MIH information service.
Theorem 1. The protocol SKD is SK-secure in the authenti-
cated links model (AM) if the encryption algorithm Enc () used
in SKD is a CCA-(chosen ciphertext attack-) secure symmetric
encryption scheme.
Proof sketch. It is easy to see that both parties MN and IS are
in possession of the same session key upon the completion
of the protocol execution, and therefore the protocol satisfies
condition 1 of SK-security in Definition 1. So we concentrate
on proving condition 2 of the SK-security.
Let A be an adversary against the protocol SKD. Let ε
be the advantage of A indistinguishing between a session
key and a random value of the same length. We show that
if ε is nonnegligible, we can construct an algorithm D to
break the encryption algorithm Enc (). D sets up a virtual
scenario for the run of SKD and activates A. Virtual players
include user MN, information server IS and authentication
server AS. The scheduled operations are performed by D
on behalf of all virtual players for SKD. We use x (resp., y
and z) to denote the maximum number of MN (resp., IS
and AS) that can be invoked. Let l denote the maximum
number of sessions between the chosen parties. By running
A as a subroutine, D can break the encryption algorithm
Enc () with overall probability 1/2 + ε/lxyz. The advantage
ε/lxyz is non-negligible. This contradicts our assumptions
in Theorem 1.
4.2. Anonymous SKD Protocol in AM. Now we focus on
extending the SKD protocol to achieve user anonymity. In
[28], the authors proposed a general security framework to
capture user anonymity and untraceability. They introduced
a security definition for anonymity and untraceability in
UM. Diﬀerent to [28], we will define anonymity and
untraceability in AM.
Let l be a system-wide security parameter. Let M(l) =
{M1, . . . ,MQ1(l)} the set of mobile users in the system, I(l) =
{I1, . . . , IQ2(l)} the set of information servers in the system,
and A(l) = {A1, . . . ,AQ3(l)} be the set of authentication
servers in the system, where Q1, Q2, and Q3 are some
polynomials and Mt , Iu, and Av are the corresponding
identifiers of the parties, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Q1(l), 1 ≤ u ≤ Q2(l)
and 1 ≤ v ≤ Q3(l). First we depict a game of attacker similar
to [28].
AnonymousGame: The game is carried out by a simulator
S which runs an adversary A. It is based on the adversarial
model AM.
(1) S sets up a system with users in M(l), information
servers in I(l), and authentication servers in A(l).
(2) S then runs A and answers A’s queries.
(3) A can execute the SKD protocol on any parties in the
system by activating these parties and making queries.
(4) Among all the parties in the system, A picks two users
Mt , Mu ∈ M(l), an information server I ∈ I(l), and an
authentication server A ∈ A(l), such that Mt, and Mu are
the registration users of A.
(5) A sends a test query by providing Mu, Mv , I, and A.
(6) The simulator S simulates one SKD protocol run
among Mu, I and A, and another one among Mv , I and A.
S also updates the state information of each party due to the
simulation. Then S tosses a coin b, bR ← {0, 1}. If b = 0, the
simulation transcript with Mu is returned to A, otherwise,
that with Mv is returned to A.
(7) After receiving the response of the test query, A can
still launch all the allowable attacks through queries and also
activate parties for protocol executions as before.
(8) At the end of A’s run, it outputs a bit b′ (as its guess
for b).
A wins the game if (1) A, Mu, and Mv are uncorrupted,
(2) for the one session above, A can only perform session-
state reveal, session-key reveal,and session expiration queries
to I. (3) A guesses correctly the bit b (i.e., outputs b′ = b).
Define AdvA(l) = Pr[A wins the game]− 1
2
. (1)
Definition 2. (user anonymity and untraceability) An SKD
protocol provides user anonymity and untraceability if for
suﬃciently large security parameter l, AdvA(l) is negligible.
The formulation of Definition 2 is very powerful and can
be shown to ensure both user anonymity and user untrace-
ability required by a good SKD protocol. It guarantees that
as long as the authentication server is uncorrupted, the
adversary can neither tell the identity from the messages of
one session nor link that session to another one.
Based on the secure SKD protocol (in AM), we now
modify it so that it also provides user anonymity and
untraceability. To provide user anonymity, the identity of the
user should not be sent in clear. In addition, the identity
should not be known to the information server according to
the anonymity definition above. To do so, we use an identity
hiding mechanism. Figure 7 depicts the message flows of the
anonymous SKD protocol.
(1) IS service ticket request (MN→AS). MN selects a random
number r computes k = pr f (gxr) as an anonymity key using
the random number r and public key gx of AS. The identity
IDMN of MN is encrypted with k. A temporary identity TID
is also computed using the equation TID = h(gr). Then MN
sends a service ticket request message (T REQ) to AS for IS.
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TReq, gr , TID, IDIS, Enck(IDMN)
TRes, TID, IDIS, T , EnckM (TID, IDIS, σ)
SAReq, TID, IDIS, T
MN AS IS
SARes, TID, IDIS
Figure 7: Flow chart of anonymous SKD protocol for MIIS access.
The message content of T REQ is as the following: {TReq, gr ,
TID, IDIS, Enck(IDMN)}.
(2) IS service ticket response (AS→MN). Upon receiving the
T REQ message from MN, AS extracts gr , then computes
k = pr f (grx) using gr and its private key x. AS decrypts
Enck(IDMN), and gets identity of MN. AS finds the item
related to MN in its database, namely, the entry (MN, kM ,
service list). AS checks service list of MN to find whether
it has subscribed service of IS. If MN has not subscribed
the service of IS, AS will respond a reject message to MN.
Otherwise, a service ticket T will be generated for MN. AS
chooses a random number σas the service key used by MN
and IS for secure connection. The format of service ticket
is as follows: T = {TID, IDIS, EnckAS-IS (TID, IDIS, σ)}. AS
generates a service ticket response (T RES) message. The
T RES message consists of the following items: {TRes, TID,
IDIS, T, EnckM (TID, IDIS, σ)}.
(3) IS service access request (MN→ IS). When MN receives
the T RES message from AS, MN decrypts EnckM(TID, IDIS,
σ) to get the service key σ . MN needs to send an information
Service Access REQuest message (S Acce REQ) to IS. The
format of the message is as: {SAReq, TID, IDIS, T}.
(4) IS service access response (IS→MN). On receiving the
IS Acce REQ message, IS decrypts T using the key kAS-IS
to obtain the temporary identity of MN (which is con-
firmed by AS) and service key σ . IS then computes ks =
pr f (σ , TID, IDIS) as the service session key. IS generates an
information Service Access RESponse message (S Acce RES)
and sends to MN. The message has the following items:
SARes, TID, IDIS.
After MN receives S Acce RES message, MN computes
ks = pr f (σ , TID, IDIS) as the session key of information
service. Afterwards, MN use, the service session key to secure
access MIH information service.
Theorem 2. If Enc () is CCA-secure and CDH (compute diﬃe-
helleman) problem is diﬃcult, the advantage AdvA(l) that A
wins the anonymity game is negligible.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Namely, if the protocol
is not anonymous, that is, if A wins the game with non-
negligible advantage, AdvA(l), over random guess (which is
half chance), we construct a distinguisher D to break Enc ()
or to solve CDH problem.
We start by describing a game for the distinguisher D.
First, D adaptively queries a decryption oracle with any
ciphertext. Then D chooses two messages msg0 and msg1
and asks the game simulator for a ciphertext. The simulator
randomly picks bR ← {0, 1} and gives D the ciphertext c
such that c = Enck(msgb).
After receiving c, D adaptively queries the decryption
oracle with any ciphertext except c. D is to output a value
b′ ∈ {0, 1} as its guess for b. Now we construct D which
simulates anonymous game. First, D sets up the system
appropriately by creating a set M(l) of users, a set I(l) of
information servers, and a set A(l) of authentication servers.
It then initializes all the users inM(l) and information servers
with randomly chosen symmetric keys from {0, 1}l, and
initializes all the authentication servers in A(l) with ran-
domly chosen public key pairs for encryption. Afterwards,
D randomly picks an authentication server A, and replaces
its encryption public key and private key corresponding to
gx and x.
D runs A as a subroutine and answers all its queries
and simulates all the responses of party activation due to
protocol execution. If A picks Mu, Mv as two users, A as
the authentication server, and I as the information server
during the test query, D answers the query by providing the
transcript of a protocol constructed as follows.
First, D randomly chooses a session ID s in {0, 1}k, and
constructs two messages msg0 and msg1 as follows: msg0 =
IDMu, and msg1 = IDMv.
D queries the CCA-security encryption oracle with msg0
and msg1. Suppose the CCA-security oracle returns gr and
a ciphertext c, which satisfies c = Enck(msgb), where k =
pr f (grx). Then, D constructs
message 1: TReq, gr , TID, IDIS, c
message 2: TRes, TID, IDIS, T, EnckM(TID, IDIS, σ)
message 3: SAReq, TID, IDIS, T
message 4: SARes, TID, IDIS
The transcript returned by D to A, as the response for A’s
test query is (message 1, message 2, message 3, message 4).
D continues the game by answering all the queries made by
A and simulating all the responses of party activation due to
protocol execution. If A corrupts I, the simulator returns the
long-term keys of I, and the internal state of I which includes
the state information of session s, to A.
When A outputs a bit value b as its guess, D outputs b′
and halts. If A does not pick A as the authentication server
in his test query, D just randomly picks a value b′R ← {0, 1},
outputs it and halts.
Analysis. Let E be the event that A picks A as the authentica-
tion server in its test query. Since D chooses A from A(l) in
the game uniformly at random, Pr[E] = 1/Q3(l).
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which is non-negligible over random guess.
D may win the game by the following means.
(1) D analyses CCA-secure encryption scheme with the
help of adaptive query to plaintext of any chosen
ciphertext except to the challenge c.
(2) D computes the key k = pr f (grx) with the knowledge
of gr and gx, then decrypt the ciphertext c to getmsgb;
(3) D guesses b directly with correct probability 1/2.
Assume probability of case (1) is AdvEnc and probability
of case (2) is AdvCDH.
Thus, AdvEnc + AdvCDH ≥ Pr[D guesses b correctly]−1/2
= AdvA(l)/Q3(l).
If AdvA(l) is non-negligible, at least one of AdvEnc
and AdvCDH is non-negligible. So we have constructed a
distinguisher D to break Enc () or to solve CDH problem.
4.3. Anonymous SKD Protocol in UM. Now we come to
the anonymous secure key distribution protocol in UM.
Since the adversary can forge and modify any message,
the identities of the user, the information server, and the
authentication server all should be authenticated in the
scenario.
An anonymous SKD protocol in UM can be derived by
applying certain MT-authenticators to the SKD protocol in
AM according to the CK approach [25]. Here we apply the
one-pass timestamp based-MT-authenticator to the message
flows of the protocol depicted in Figure 7.
The one-pass timestamp based MT-authenticator is
depicted as Figure 8. Though the authenticator is very simple,
it is widely used in synchronized system. It helps simplify
the authentication procedures and improve the protocol
eﬃciency.
Suppose that a party Pi shares a random key κ with
another party Pj . There exists a time synchronization
mechanism between Pi and Pj . The one-pass timestamp
based MT-authenticator λt proceeds as follow:
(i) Whenever Pi wants to send a message m to
Pj , Pi extracts its timestamp tPi, sends m, tPi,
MACκ(m,Pj , tPi) to Pj , where MAC is a message
authentication function, and adds a message “Pi sent
m to Pj” to P′i s local output.
Table 1: Cryptographic operations and computational costs.
Computation operations Notation Time (ms)
Certificate validation TCV 10.5
DH key generation TDH 14.2
Random number generation TRG 0.09
Hash value computation THC 0.03
Key derivation TKD 0.03
Symmetric encryption TSE 0.12
Symmetric decryption TSD 0.12
(ii) Upon receiving m, tPi, MACκ(m,Pj , tPi), Pj verifies
that the MACκ(m,Pj , tPi) is correct and tPi is within
allowable range. If all verifications are correct, Pj
outputs “Pj received m from Pi.”
After deriving the anonymous SKD protocol in UM, an
optimization [26] of message flows can be applied. As a
result, we obtain a UM anonymous SK-secure protocol SAM
in Figure 5, which provides secure access for information
service with user anonymity.
5. Performance Analysis
Protocol performance has become an increasingly important
concern in wireless computing and networking environ-
ments. It is always desirable to make an authentication
protocol more eﬃcient. Our protocol may be quite eﬃcient,
since it relies mainly on symmetric key operations and a few
rounds of message exchanges during access authentication
process. The computational cost of our protocol is very
reasonable, especially for the mobile node. The computation
operations in our protocol are negligible compared to any
strong public-key authentication. In the proposal of 802.21a
task group [19], EAP framework is suggested to fulfill
mutual authentication between peers for the centralized
MIH service. EAP-TLS [29] is a typical and widely applied
authentication protocol in EAP protocol family. We take it as
an example for comparison.
To evaluate our protocol and 802.21a proposal, we
implemented all cryptographic operations required in the
two schemes using the Crypto++ Library (version 5.6.1)
[30]. The cryptographic experiments were executed on a
laptop with PIII 1.6 GHz CPU and 128MB RAM. The results
are listed in Table 1, where SHA-1, AES, and RSA are used
for analysis. The computational costs required by MN, AS,
and IS (or PoS) are given in Table 2. Compared with SAM,
802.21a proposal is a rather complex and high-cost process
because of using public key certificates. That method adds
too much load to entities involved (consuming much time
and energy). According to Table 2, we can conclude that the
computational cost of MN, AS and IS can be reduced nearly
by 41.7%, 40.8% and 30.0% in SAM, respectively.
As to communication performance, in the first phase
of SAM (service ticket request), only a 2-way handshake is
executed between MN and AS. It fulfils tasks of data origin
authentication and service ticket distribution. In the second
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Table 2: Computational costs in 802.21a and SAM.
802.21a SAM
MN TCV + TDH + TRG + 2THC + 2TKD = 24.91 TDH + TRG + 4THC + TKD + TSE + TSD = 14.68
AS TCV + TDH + TKD + TSE = 24.85 TDH + TRG + 2THC + 2TSE + TSD = 14.71
IS TRG + 2THC + TKD + TSD = 0.3 2THC + TKD + TSD = 0.21
Total time 50.06 29.60




























Figure 9: Comparison about average authentication latency.
phase (information service access request), mutual authenti-
cation between MN and IS is also carried out through a 2-
way handshake procedure. Nevertheless in 802.21a proposal,
a full EAP-TLS procedure requires 8 message flows between
MN and AS for their mutual authentication, afterwards it
has to performmutual authentication between PoS of IS, and
MN (at least 3 message flows). The whole process of 802.21a
needs so many message flows that it consumes too much
bandwidth and time. Thus our protocol performs better than
the proposal of 802.21a task group.
We carried out some simulation experiments of SAM
and 802.21a proposal using OPNET 10.5 [31] to verify
analysis above. For simplicity, only a WLAN was used
as the access network in the topology, and one AS and
one IS were deployed, where the two servers were both
connected to the Internet as in Figure 4. The simulations run
with 20∼100MNs and 10APs uniformly distributed in the
WLAN area for 5 minutes of simulation time. For the MIIS
authentication request pattern, each MN made 10 requests
randomly distributed over the whole simulation period. The
simulation parameters are listed in Table 3. Here we mainly
focus on the measurements of average authentication latency
and the number of messages delivered in the network.
Figure 9 shows the average authentication latency of the
two schemes as the number of MNs changes. We can see
that the average authentication latency of SAM and 802.21a
both become larger as the number of MNs increases. The
reason is that the number of packets generated in the network
increases as the number of MNs increases, which makes
packets collision and retransmission happen more often.
The average authentication latency obtained using SAM is
Table 3: Simulation parameters.
WLAN area 300m∗300m
The number of AP 10
Coverage of AP 100m
The number of MNs 20∼100
The number of MIIS request for each MN 10
Simulation time 5 minutes
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

























Figure 10: Comparison about number of messages delivered
about 60% to that obtained using 802.21a in all scenarios.
This suggests that SAM is highly eﬀective in authentication
latency. Figure 10 shows the changes of the number of
messages delivered in the network when the number of MNs
changes. As we can see from the results, the number of
messages delivered of 802.21a increases sharply while that of
SAM increases smoothly as the number of MNs increases.
The number of messages delivered of SAM is about 30% to
that of 802.21a in all scenarios.
The simulation results indicate that SAM has advantages
in communication performance compared with 802.21a.
6. Conclusions and Future Works
The IEEE 802.21 standard aims at optimizing handovers
among heterogeneous wireless networks. In this paper, we
propose an anonymous access authentication protocol for
MIIS defined in the 802.21 standard. We adopt a modified
version of Kerberos featuring of user anonymity in service
ticket distribution and service access authentication. The
security and performance analyses show that the proposed
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scheme has good characteristics. In fact, our work can be
applied to oﬀer integrated authentication and authorization
functionalities for any type of application service.
By ensuring a robust access authentication for MIIS, our
scheme can be a step forward from best-eﬀort to support
seamlessly mobility in wireless world. Now we are making an
eﬀort to put up a real testbed to evaluate performance of our
protocol. There are also some interesting works deserving
considerations. The information server may not have a
previously established security association with the mobile
user’s authentication server, then how to implement secure
access for MIIS at this scenario? The mobile user and the
information server may belong to diﬀerent security domains,
thus cross-domain authentication schemes ought to be
established. In the future heterogeneous networks, there
may exist several information servers deployed by diﬀerent
providers; the mobile user needs an eﬃcient method to
choose a more trusted one from a set of information servers.
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